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Abstract
The vulnerability of facial recognition systems through morphing attacks is a known
problem. Since the first publication about this vulnerability of facial recognition systems,
a variety of morphing attack detection methods have been presented, promising an au-
tomated detection of such fraudulent attacks. In this work, a new approach is presented
attempting to distinguish bona fide from morphed images based on information about the
edges in the image extracted by the Laplace operator. It can be demonstrated that the
features employed contain information that can contribute to the detection of morphed
face images.
1 Introduction
Image morphing techniques can be used to combine information from two (or more) images into
one image. Morphing techniques can also be used to create a morphed facial image from the
biometric face images of two individuals, of which the biometric information is similar to that
of both individuals. Realistically looking morphed face images can be generated by unskilled
users applying readily available tools [17].
In most countries, the passport photo is provided by the applicant in digital or analogue
form when applying for a passport. This allows a wanted criminal to create a morphed passport
photo with the help of an accomplice, with which the accomplice can then apply for a passport.
Since most morphed passport photos are capable of deceiving a human observer as well as face
recognition systems [3, 14], the wanted criminal can authenticate himself with the passport of
his accomplice and, e.g., use the passport to cross borders. This problem can be reduced to a
large extent by a supervised enrolment during the passport application process, as is done in
Norway. However, as long as not all countries whose passports are accepted introduce supervised
enrolment processes, all countries will have to check at the border for morphed passport photos
in the passports of other countries as well.
Due to the great attack potential, there is a growing interest in reliable methods to detect
morping attacks. The methods for detecting morping attacks can be divided into two classes.
Single image Morphing Attack Detection (MAD) and differential MAD. With single image
MAD, the algorithm only has the potential morph at its disposal, for example the passport photo
at the handover during the passport application. In the differential MAD scenario, however,
the algorithm has access to an additional trusted live capture of the subject, for example the
sample image the eGate captures during passport control during border crossing of the subject.
Most algorithms proposed to date are based on the single image scenario. This scenario is
easier to reproduce by databases and the algorithms are easier to implement. Differential
MAD algorithms, however, have the capability to achieve higher recognition performance and
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Table 1: Overview of most relevant differential MAD algorithms.
Reference Approach Category Morphing method Source face DB
Scherhag et al. [18]
Differences in deep face
features with SVM
Feature comparison 4 different Methods
FERET [13],
FRGCv2 [12]
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robustness due to the additional information provided by trusted live capture. In this paper a
differential MAD algorithm is proposed.
Table 1 lists the relevant differential MAD algorithms. The algorithms can be divided into
two categories. Feature comparison and morphing reversion. Feature comparison algorithms
are based on the comparison of features extracted from the potential morph and the trusted
live capture. These can be explicit features like texture features extracted by BSIF [16] or
landmark features [15], or implicit features extracted by deep learning [18].
Morphing reversion, on the other hand, follows the approach that the (possibly) performed
morphing process for the passport photo is reversed using the trusted live capture. The idea
is that after the revision of the morphing in case of a morph, the second subject appears, but
if no other subject is present (bona fides passport photo), the subject remains in the passport
photo after the revision.
The approach proposed in this publication is based on feature comparison. It is assumed
that the number and intensity of edges in the image is reduced by the averaging process during
the morphing of two images. The approach aims to make these parameters measurable using
the Laplace operator. To achieve independence of the algorithm from the facial characteristics
of the subject, the number and intensity of edges in the trusted live capture is subtracted from
those in the potential morph.
2 Laplace operator
The Laplace operator highlights regions of intensity discontinuities and is usually used in image
processing to find edges or other fine details on a dark background. It could be interpreted
as an extension of the Sobel operator [8]. Since edges represent significant local changes of
intensity in an image, the Sobel operator calculates the first-order derivative of the intensity
function (the grayscale-values of the image), that reaches its local maximum in the edge regions.
Figure 1c to 1e illustrates the behaviour of the Sobel operator for edges in the grayscale image.
In the second derivation, a corner leads to zero crossings, as shown in Figure 1e.
The Laplace operator approximates the second derivative of the Sobel operator, whereby
edges in the original image are reflected as bright areas in the Laplace image. For example,
the corner of the mouth (indicated by a circle in figure 1a), which leads to a bright region in
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(a) Crop of faceimage. An example
for an edge is highlighted by a red
circle
(b) Sobel operator on cropped
faceimage
(c) Example of Sobel operator on
edges
(d) Example of first derivative of
the Sobel operator on edges
(e) Example of second derivative of
the Sobel operator on edges. Zero
crossings are highlighted
Figure 1: Example for the principle of the Laplace operator
Figure 1b.
Mathematically the Laplace operator (∆) for 2-dimensional space in a Cartesian coordinate



















Due to the fact, that the Laplace operator approximates a second derivative measurement on
the image, the result of the transformation is very sensitive to noise. To handle this, a Gaussian
blur is applied to the original image, since it reduces the high frequency noise components to
the differentiation step, leading to the so-called Laplacian of Gaussian (LoG) filter.
3 Proposed system
The proposed algorithm for morphing attack detection is based on the LoG operator, which
can be divided into the Gaussian and the Laplace filter.
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Gaussian filter:
To reduce noise, the image is processed by smoothing with a Gaussian filter. In the proposed
method the kernel size of 3 is chosen for facial images cropped as depicted in Figure 1a and
scaled to 320 × 320 pixels. Larger kernel would lead to a higher smoothing effect, reducing
unwanted noise artefacts, but also the number of zero crossings would drop, reducing the capa-
bilities of the Laplace filter.
Laplace filter:
As described in equation 1 the two-dimensional Laplace operator is composed of the second
derivative in x and y dimension. These derivatives can be approximated by filter operations of
size 3 × 3:
∂2x =
0 0 01 −2 1
0 0 0
 ∂2y =
0 1 00 −2 0
0 1 0
 (2)
According to equation 1 the resulting Laplace operator can be written as:
∆ =
0 0 01 −2 1
0 0 0
+
0 1 00 −2 0
0 1 0
 =
0 1 01 −4 1
0 1 0
 (3)
The edges of the image can be determined using the zero crossings of the Laplace func-
tion, as shown in figure 1. To detect these, regions with sign changes are searched for in the
Laplace image. To form the feature vector, the intensities of the determined zero crossings are
transferred into a histogram, which is subsequently normalized.
To achieve the differential detection scenario, the histograms of probe and corresponding
reference are subtracted and z-normalized, so that the differential histogram is used as a classifier
input [16]. A number of support vector machines (SVM) with radial basis function (RBF)
kernel, which is frequently used in SVM classification [1], are trained on the pre-processed
input data.
4 Experiments
The Experiments are performed on the MAD database, introduced in [18], which consists of
images from the FRGCv2 [12] and color FERET [13] face database. The morphs are created,
by applying four different automated morphing tools:
1. FaceFusion1, a proprietary morphing algorithm. Originally being an iOS app, we de-
ployed an adaptation for Windows which uses the 68 landmarks of Dlib and Delaunay
triangles. After the morphing process, certain regions (eyes, nostrils, hair) of the first
face image are blended over the morph to hide artefacts. The corresponding landmarks
of upper and lower lips can be reduced as described in [9] to avoid artefacts at closed
mouths. The created morphs have a high quality and low to no visible artefacts.
2. FaceMorpher2, an open-source implementation using Python. In the version applied
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which are formed from the landmarks, are wrapped and blended. The area outside the
landmarks is averaged. The generated morphs show strong artefacts in particular in the
area of neck and hair.
3. OpenCV, a self-made morphing algorithm derived from “Face Morph Using OpenCV”3.
This algorithm works similar to FaceMorpher. Important differences between the algo-
rithms are that for landmark detection Dlib is used instead of STASM and that additional
landmarks are positioned at the edges of the image, which are also used to create the
morphs. Thus, in contrast to FaceMorpher, the outer facial area does not consist of an
averaged image, but like the rest of the image, of morphed triangles. However, visible
artefacts outside the face area can be observed, which is mainly due to missing landmarks.
4. UBO-Morpher, the morphing tool of University of Bologna, as used, e.g., in [4]. Dlib
landmarks were used for this algorithm. The morphs are generated by triangulation,
averaging and blending. To avoid the artefacts in the area outside the face, the morphed
face is copied to the background of one of the original images. Even if the colors are
adjusted at boundaries, visible edges may appear at the transitions.
The SVMs were trained on the images originating from FRGCv2 and subsequently evaluated
on the FERET, and vice versa. Thus, a strict separation of training and test data is achieved,
as well as a high variance in the data between these sets. The test and training sets only consist
of images, created with one of the four morphing tools, mentioned above. As an example, the
data trained on FRGC with FaceFusion is evaluated on FERET with OpenCV.
The accuracy of the detection algorithm is reported using the Detection Equal Error Rate
(D-EER), i.e., at the decision threshold where the proportion of attack presentations incor-
rectly classified as bona fide presentations (APCER) is as high as the proportion of bona fide
presentations incorrectly classified as presentation attack (BPCER). For APCER and BPCER
the definitions of ISO IEC 30107-3 [7] for measuring accuracy of presentation attack detection
are used:
APCER: proportion of attack presentations incorrectly classified as bona fide pre-
sentations in a specific scenario
BPCER: proportion of bona fide presentations incorrectly classified as presentation
attacks in a specific scenario
The results determined on the database are shown in table 2. It can be seen that the
presented approach is basically suitable to recognize morphed images, which confirms that the
Laplace filter is able to extract useful information. However, the error rates also show that
the approach needs further improvement before it is able to produce error rates that can be
compared to other differential MAD methods. In particular, the results achieved on the basis
of deep features [18] are significantly better.
The results show that the morphs generated by the more advanced morphing algorithms
(FaceFusion and UBO-Morpher) tend to be more difficult to detect with the Laplace operator-
based approach than the images morphed with the simpler algorithms. For example, after
training on FaceFusion Morphs, the FaceMorpher Morphs of the FERET database can be
recognized with a D-EER of 20.9%, whereas the FaceFusion Morphs themselves can only be
recognized with a D-EER of 27.3%.
3www.learnopencv.com/face-morph-using-opencv-cpp-python/
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Table 2: Performance results of Laplace operator based MAD











































The approach proposed in this publication is based on feature comparison. It is assumed
that the number and intensity of corners in the image is reduced by the averaging process
during the morphing of two images. The approach aims to make these parameters measurable
using the Laplace operator.
5 Conclusion
Morphing attacks remain a serious threat to the proper functioning of facial recognition sys-
tems.Especially in the area of automatic border control via eGates, a solution for the robust
recognition of morphed images is needed to ensure a secure operation. In this paper it is
demonstrated, that information about edges in the image extracted by the Laplace operator
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can contribute to the detection of these attacks. Although the results obtained so far do not
allow the use of these feature extractors in a solitary system, they motivate further research
towards these feature extractors, whether to further refine this approach or to combine it with
other approaches to achieve a more robust overall system.
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